Q2: What are the key features of the US new Indo-Pacific strategy under Joe Biden administration? How does it treat China?
Outline
- Introduction
- Background: Evolution of US Indo-Pacific Strategy
- Key Features of Biden’s Indo-Pacific Strategy (2022)
- Commitment to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific
- Reinforcement of Alliances and Partnerships
- Integrated Deterrence and Security Frameworks
- Focus on Democratic Values and Digital Infrastructure
- Economic Framework: Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF)
- How the Strategy Treats China
- Strategic Competition Framing
- Defensive Encirclement and Maritime Containment
- Technological and Economic Decoupling
- Real-World Implications and Developments
- Theoretical Lens: Realism, Strategic Hedging, Neoliberal Institutionalism
- Conclusion
- Introduction
The Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, unveiled in February 2022, seeks to bolster American leadership in the region by promoting a “free, open, connected, secure, and resilient Indo-Pacific”. This strategy builds upon the Trump-era “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” vision but places greater emphasis on multilateralism, democratic alliances, and strategic competition with China.
As per Kurt Campbell, Biden’s Indo-Pacific coordinator:
“The future of the 21st century will be largely written in the Indo-Pacific.”
- Background: Evolution of US Indo-Pacific Strategy
- Obama’s “Pivot to Asia” (2011) initiated the shift from West Asia to East Asia
- Trump’s FOIP (Free and Open Indo-Pacific) expanded the concept, focusing on strategic balancing against China
- Biden’s version blends hard balancing with soft institutional cooperation, reflecting continuity with added economic and democratic focus
- Key Features of Biden’s Indo-Pacific Strategy (2022)
The strategy rests on five key objectives:
- Advance a Free and Open Indo-Pacific
- Promotes rule of law, freedom of navigation, and peaceful dispute resolution
- Counters China’s assertive behavior in South China Sea (SCS) and Taiwan Strait
- Opposes “coercion and aggression” by any state—implicit reference to China
- Build Connections within and Beyond the Region
- Strengthening Quad (U.S., India, Japan, Australia)
- Reaffirming alliances with Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Thailand
- Deepening cooperation with ASEAN, Pacific Islands, and South Asia (including India)
Quote from the strategy document:
“Our alliances and partnerships are our greatest strategic asset.”
- Drive Regional Prosperity via IPEF
- Launched Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) in 2022
- Focuses on trade, clean energy, digital economy, and anti-corruption
- 14 countries joined, including India, Indonesia, and Vietnam
IPEF deliberately excludes China, offering an alternative economic vision.
- Bolster Indo-Pacific Security
- Promotes “integrated deterrence” through military coordination, intelligence sharing
- Strengthens AUKUS pact (nuclear submarines to Australia)
- Resurrects security dialogue with India and ASEAN
- Build Regional Resilience
- Addresses climate change, pandemic response, and cyber security
- Supports counter-disinformation and digital infrastructure (5G, undersea cables)
- Offers regional states alternatives to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
- How the Strategy Treats China
Biden’s Indo-Pacific strategy treats China as a strategic competitor, not a partner. The tone is firm but calibrated, avoiding open containment rhetoric yet adopting aggressive balancing mechanisms.
- Strategic Competition Framing
- The strategy calls China the “most consequential geopolitical challenge”
- Seeks to “shape the strategic environment around China” rather than regime change
- Maintains “One China Policy” but opposes “unilateral change in Taiwan’s status”
- Defensive Encirclement and Maritime Containment
- Expands U.S. naval presence in South China Sea and East China Sea
- Conducts Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs)
- Encourages India to counterbalance China on land borders (Ladakh) and Indian Ocean
- Technological and Economic Decoupling
- Enforces chip export bans and controls against Huawei, TikTok
- Promotes 5G Clean Network initiatives
- Encourages allies to reduce economic dependence on Chinese supply chains
As per U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan (2023):
“We are not seeking to contain China, but to ensure the rules of the road are upheld.”
- Real-World Implications and Developments
- Taiwan Strait crisis (2022–23): U.S. support for Taiwan and arms sales continue, provoking Chinese military drills
- India-U.S. alignment: India signed BECA and LEMOA agreements, enabling real-time military cooperation
- AUKUS deepens military tech transfers, including nuclear-powered submarines
- Quad evolves into a platform for vaccine diplomacy, maritime security, and tech coordination
- Pacific Islands Forum (2023): U.S. re-engagement to counter Chinese influence in the South Pacific
- Theoretical Lens: Realism, Strategic Hedging, Institutionalism
- Realism
The strategy reflects offensive realism—a structural attempt to balance the rising hegemon (China) through alliances, military deterrence, and economic exclusion.
- Strategic Hedging
U.S. enables regional actors like Vietnam, Philippines, and India to hedge between economic relations with China and security alignment with the U.S.
- Neoliberal Institutionalism
While building institutions like IPEF and Quad, U.S. still avoids binding trade deals like TPP, highlighting a shift from rules-based liberalism to flexible cooperation.
- Conclusion
The Biden Indo-Pacific Strategy is a comprehensive, multi-dimensional response to China’s expanding economic and military influence. By framing the region as the center of global gravity, the U.S. aims to maintain its primacy through alliances, trade alternatives, and technological leadership.
While avoiding direct confrontation, the strategy undoubtedly treats China as a revisionist power, pushing back through military posturing, institutional isolation, and economic realignment.
As strategic scholar Ashley Tellis noted:
“The U.S. is no longer competing over the Indo-Pacific—it is competing over the rules that will govern its future.”
Q3: What are the Russian objectives behind military intervention in Ukraine? Discuss whether Western sanctions can prove effective as an instrument to counter the Russian act.
Outline
- Introduction
- Background to the Russia-Ukraine Conflict
- Russia’s Strategic Objectives in Ukraine
- Geopolitical Buffer Against NATO
- Assertion of Spheres of Influence
- Protection of Russian Identity and Interests in Eastern Ukraine
- Control over Crimea and Access to the Black Sea
- Regime Destabilization in Kyiv
- Nature and Scope of Western Sanctions
- Effectiveness of Western Sanctions
- Economic Impact on Russia
- Military and Strategic Impact
- Political and Diplomatic Effects
- Russia’s Response and Evasion Mechanisms
- Theoretical Framework: Realism and Sanctions Theory
- Conclusion
- Introduction
The Russian military intervention in Ukraine, beginning in February 2022, marked the largest conventional military operation in Europe since World War II. It sparked widespread condemnation, leading to unprecedented economic sanctions from the West. This conflict has reshaped global power alignments, challenging the liberal international order.
The central questions are: What does Russia aim to achieve through this war, and can Western sanctions alter Russian behavior or deter future aggression?
- Background to the Russia-Ukraine Conflict
The seeds of conflict were sown in:
- NATO’s eastward expansion post-1991, despite prior assurances to Russia
- The 2014 Euromaidan revolution, which ousted a pro-Russian president in Kyiv
- Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014
- Escalation in Donetsk and Luhansk, where Russian-backed separatists declared independence
These developments laid the groundwork for the 2022 full-scale invasion.
- Russia’s Strategic Objectives in Ukraine
- Geopolitical Buffer Against NATO
Russia perceives NATO expansion into former Soviet republics as a direct security threat. The idea of Ukraine joining NATO would bring Western forces to Russia’s doorstep.
Vladimir Putin (2021) declared:
“Ukraine in NATO is a red line… we will react harshly if crossed.”
Thus, pre-emptive military action aimed to prevent this integration and retain Ukraine as a neutral buffer state.
- Assertion of Spheres of Influence
Putin’s foreign policy reflects revanchist ambitions—restoring Russia’s dominance over its “near abroad”. This is driven by a Eurasianist ideology, viewing Ukraine as central to the Russian civilizational identity.
As IR scholar John Mearsheimer argued:
“The West is principally responsible for the Ukraine crisis by attempting to pull Ukraine into its orbit.”
- Protection of Russian Identity and Interests in Eastern Ukraine
Russia claims to protect ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking populations, particularly in the Donbas region. It accuses Kyiv of neo-Nazi repression, a charge widely rejected internationally but used for domestic legitimization.
- Control Over Crimea and Black Sea Access
The Crimean Peninsula holds strategic importance due to:
- Russia’s Black Sea Fleet base at Sevastopol
- Geopolitical access to the Mediterranean via the Turkish straits
- Natural gas reserves off Crimea’s coast
Securing Crimea and adjacent territories creates a “land bridge” from Russia to Crimea.
- Regime Destabilization in Kyiv
Russia seeks to replace Ukraine’s pro-Western government with one more amenable to Moscow’s interests, aiming to deny the West a political foothold in Ukraine.
- Nature and Scope of Western Sanctions
The West, led by the EU, US, UK, Canada, and Japan, has imposed the most comprehensive sanctions in modern history, targeting:
- Central Bank of Russia (freezing over $300 billion of reserves)
- SWIFT ban for major Russian banks
- Embargoes on Russian oil and gas (partial in EU, full in US)
- Export controls on semiconductors, dual-use technologies
- Personal sanctions on oligarchs, officials, and Putin’s inner circle
- Asset seizures (e.g., yachts, real estate)
- Suspension of visa regimes, and sporting, academic, and cultural boycotts
- Effectiveness of Western Sanctions
- Economic Impact on Russia
- Russian economy shrank 2.1% in 2022, but rebounded with 3.5% growth in 2023 (IMF)
- Ruble initially crashed but recovered, helped by capital controls and oil revenue
- Inflation peaked at 17.8%, but was brought under control with tight monetary policy
- Western firms exited, disrupting consumer markets and tech imports
Yet, energy exports to China, India, and Turkey softened the blow.
- Military and Strategic Impact
- Export controls hurt Russian arms production and high-tech industries
- Shortages in semiconductors and avionics reported in military hardware
- However, Russia adapted by boosting domestic production and import substitution
Despite sanctions, Russia has continued its war with tactical adaptations.
- Political and Diplomatic Effects
- Sanctions consolidated Russian public opinion against the West
- Putin used sanctions as evidence of Western hostility, strengthening nationalist narratives
- Key states like China, India, Iran, and Gulf nations refused to join sanctions
Thus, sanctions had limited isolating effect globally.
- Russia’s Response and Evasion Mechanisms
- Strengthened trade with China (+34% in 2023) and India (oil exports up 10x)
- Created alternate payment systems: MIR card, SPFS (Russian SWIFT alternative)
- Increased use of yuan and rupees, promoting de-dollarization
- Crypto adoption for cross-border trade in blacklisted sectors
- Domestic rally-around-the-flag effect hardened elite unity
- Theoretical Framework
- Realism
Russia’s actions reflect offensive realism—a great power ensuring its security and regional dominance by denying NATO expansion. Sanctions are viewed as instruments of conflict, not deterrents.
- Sanctions Theory
- Smart sanctions aim to target elites, not the general population
- However, in Russia’s case, elite cohesion remains, and popular backlash is minimal due to information control
- Sanctions have limited utility against revisionist authoritarian states with energy leverage
- Economic Statecraft
Sanctions are an extension of foreign policy by economic means. Their effectiveness depends on:
- Multilateral enforcement
- Target state’s economic resilience
- Availability of alternate trade partners
- Conclusion
Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine is driven by a mix of security concerns, revisionist ambitions, and historical grievances. It aims to redraw regional power lines and assert sovereignty against Western encroachment.
Western sanctions have inflicted economic discomfort, but not strategic reversal. Russia has adapted, circumvented sanctions, and leveraged its energy and geopolitical position to weather the storm.
Thus, while sanctions may contain, they have not yet compelled behavioral change. For Pakistan and other developing states, this underscores the limitations of economic coercion in modern multipolar geopolitics.
As noted by Henry Kissinger:
“A nation’s survival depends not on sanctions, but on its ability to adapt strategically.”
Q4: Why does South Asia remain the least integrated region in the world? What lessons can SAARC draw from the EU and ASEAN experience in regional integration?
Outline
- Introduction
- What is Regional Integration?
- South Asia: The Least Integrated Region – Facts and Causes
- Political Rivalries and Historical Animosities
- India-Pakistan Conflict
- Lack of Intra-Regional Trade
- Weak Institutional Design of SAARC
- Asymmetric Power Dynamics
- SAARC in Perspective: Structural Failures
- Comparative Analysis:
- European Union (EU)
- Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
- Lessons for SAARC
- Depoliticization of Regional Agendas
- Functional Cooperation over Political Unity
- Strong Institutions and Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
- Economic Interdependence and Trade Liberalization
- Theoretical Lens: Functionalism and Realism
- Conclusion
- Visual Aid: SAARC vs. EU vs. ASEAN
- Introduction
South Asia, home to nearly two billion people, remains one of the least economically and politically integrated regions in the world. Despite being bound by shared history, culture, and geography, the region has failed to harness cooperative potential through institutions like the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).
This stagnation stands in stark contrast to successful regional blocs such as the European Union (EU) and ASEAN, which offer compelling models of economic integration, conflict mitigation, and institutional strength.
- What is Regional Integration?
Regional integration is a process by which neighboring states coordinate policies, institutions, and economic structures to pursue common development, trade, and peace. It includes:
- Free trade agreements
- Customs unions and common markets
- Security cooperation and political harmonization
- South Asia: The Least Integrated Region – Facts and Causes
- Political Rivalries and Historical Animosities
- Partition of 1947, three wars, and unresolved issues (e.g., Kashmir) fuel deep distrust
- Bilateral disputes become regional roadblocks, paralyzing SAARC summits (e.g., 2016 Islamabad summit canceled after Uri attack)
- India-Pakistan Conflict
- Core reason for SAARC’s failure
- India’s growing economic dominance seen as hegemonic by smaller neighbors
- Pakistan’s insistence on third-party mediation clashes with India’s bilateralism doctrine
- Lack of Intra-Regional Trade
- Intra-SAARC trade is only ~5% of total trade, compared to 58% in EU and 25% in ASEAN (World Bank, 2023)
- Tariff and non-tariff barriers, visa restrictions, and poor connectivity
- SAFTA (2006) remains ineffective due to political frictions
- Weak Institutional Design of SAARC
- No dispute resolution mechanism
- Decisions require unanimous consent, leading to gridlock
- No binding enforcement authority
- Asymmetric Power Dynamics
- India’s GDP (~$3.7 trillion) is 80% of regional total
- Smaller countries (e.g., Nepal, Bhutan) often balance India via China, creating fragmentation
- SAARC in Perspective: Structural Failures
Metric | SAARC | ASEAN | EU |
Year Established | 1985 | 1967 | 1957 (Treaty of Rome) |
Members | 8 | 10 | 27 |
Intra-regional trade (%) | ~5% | ~25% | ~58% |
Dispute resolution | None | ASEAN Way | ECJ |
Supranational institutions | Weak | Moderate | Strong |
Currency union | None | None | Eurozone |
SAARC suffers from over-politicization, under-institutionalization, and geopolitical rigidity.
- Comparative Analysis
- European Union (EU)
- Originated as European Coal and Steel Community (1951) to bind former adversaries
- Supranational institutions: European Parliament, European Court of Justice, ECB
- Achieved customs union, common market, and monetary union (Eurozone)
- Conflict resolution embedded in treaty frameworks
- ASEAN
- A loose regional grouping prioritizing non-interference and gradual consensus
- Emphasizes functional cooperation in health, disaster management, and education
- Platforms like ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) enable constructive dialogue on security
- Flexible institutionalism enables progress despite Myanmar or South China Sea tensions
- Lessons for SAARC
- Depoliticize Regional Cooperation
- Start with non-controversial issues like climate change, health, education
- ASEAN’s model of quiet diplomacy offers a pragmatic alternative
- Prioritize Functionalism over Political Unity
- Sectoral cooperation (e.g., energy sharing, cultural exchanges) can build trust
- EU started with economic communities, not political unions
- Establish Strong Institutions
- SAARC needs an independent conflict resolution mechanism
- Revise veto-based unanimity in favor of qualified majority voting
- Enhance Economic Integration
- Revamp SAFTA with trade facilitation, connectivity infrastructure, and dispute arbitration
- Promote cross-border digital trade and fintech
- Inclusive Leadership
- India must adopt a non-hegemonic leadership role, similar to Germany in EU
- Pakistan and India can initiate confidence-building measures (CBMs) through SAARC
- Leverage Regional and External Forums
- Link SAARC with BIMSTEC, SCO, and China’s BRI to expand incentives
- Engage in South-South cooperation to reduce Western dependency
- Theoretical Lens: Functionalism and Realism
- Functionalism (David Mitrany)
- Integration starts with technical cooperation (e.g., energy, transport), which spills into political unity
- ASEAN’s functionalist path contrasts with SAARC’s political deadlocks
- Neofunctionalism (Ernst Haas)
- Successful integration depends on institutional trust and spillover effects
- Realism
- SAARC reflects realist distrust and zero-sum perceptions, especially between India and Pakistan
- Absence of shared security vision hampers integration
- Conclusion
South Asia remains the least integrated region due to deep-rooted mistrust, unresolved bilateral conflicts, and weak institutional frameworks. SAARC has largely been a symbolic organization with little tangible impact.
Learning from EU’s supranationalism and ASEAN’s functionalism, SAARC must restructure itself to focus on low-politics cooperation, empower its secretariat, and develop dispute resolution mechanisms.
Until India and Pakistan shift from strategic rivalry to functional cooperation, regional integration in South Asia will remain a missed opportunity.
As former Indian diplomat Shyam Saran wrote:
“If we cannot trade books and ideas across borders, we will only exchange bullets.”
Q5: How have the nuclear doctrines of India and Pakistan evolved? What do their current doctrines imply for deterrence stability in South Asia?
Outline
- Introduction
- Background: South Asia’s Nuclearization
- Evolution of India’s Nuclear Doctrine
- 1999 Draft Doctrine
- NFU Principle and Credible Minimum Deterrence
- Recent Shifts and Strategic Ambiguity
- Evolution of Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine
- Strategic Deterrence (Post-1998)
- Shift to Full Spectrum Deterrence
- Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs)
- Comparative Table: India vs. Pakistan Nuclear Doctrine
- Deterrence Stability in South Asia
- Deterrence by Punishment vs. Denial
- Crisis Stability: Kargil, 2001–02, 2016, Balakot 2019
- Role of Cold Start Doctrine (India) and Nasr Missiles (Pakistan)
- Strategic Instability Risks
- IR Theoretical Lens
- Realism
- Deterrence Theory
- Stability–Instability Paradox
- Conclusion
- Introduction
Since conducting overt nuclear tests in May 1998, India and Pakistan have been engaged in a nuclear deterrence framework marked by doctrinal evolution, strategic signaling, and operational preparedness. While both claim their arsenals are for deterrence, not warfighting, their doctrines have become increasingly assertive and complex, affecting the stability of the South Asian security architecture.
- Background: South Asia’s Nuclearization
- India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974 (Smiling Buddha), claiming peaceful intent
- Pakistan pursued nuclear development as a counterbalance, achieving weapons capability by 1998
- The 1998 Pokhran-II and Chagai-I tests ushered in an era of mutual deterrence in South Asia
However, strategic culture, threat perception, and operational doctrines have diverged, affecting regional peace.
- Evolution of India’s Nuclear Doctrine
- 1999 Draft Nuclear Doctrine (NSAB)
India’s doctrine is built on Credible Minimum Deterrence and a No First Use (NFU) policy. Its pillars:
- NFU: India will not use nuclear weapons first
- Massive retaliation in case of nuclear attack
- Civilian control over nuclear arsenal
- Maintenance of survivable second-strike capability
- Doctrinal Ambiguity (Post-2014)
Under PM Narendra Modi, statements by defense officials (e.g., Manohar Parrikar, Lt Gen BS Hooda) hinted at rethinking NFU:
“India should not bind itself irrevocably to NFU” – Manohar Parrikar (2016)
Recent developments:
- Reports of canisterized missiles (Agni-V) suggest a shift toward counterforce posture
- India’s ballistic missile defense (BMD) and MIRV programs further complicate deterrence dynamics
- Evolution of Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine
- Deterrence through Minimum Credible Deterrence (MCD)
Initially, Pakistan adhered to a policy of minimum credible deterrence to counter Indian conventional superiority.
- Shift to Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) – 2013 Onwards
In response to India’s Cold Start Doctrine (CSD), Pakistan shifted to FSD, encompassing:
- Strategic, operational, and tactical dimensions
- Development of short-range battlefield nukes (Nasr missile, 70 km range)
- Integration of nuclear options into conventional battlefield scenarios
According to Lt Gen Khalid Kidwai (2020):
“FSD deters all forms of aggression—strategic, conventional, sub-conventional, and nuclear.”
- Comparative Table: India vs. Pakistan Nuclear Doctrines
Feature | India | Pakistan |
First Use Policy | No First Use (NFU) | First Use (ambiguity retained) |
Deterrence Concept | Credible Minimum Deterrence | Full Spectrum Deterrence |
Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) | No | Yes (Nasr) |
Civilian Oversight | National Command Authority | National Command Authority |
Targeting Posture | Countervalue (cities), evolving to counterforce | Ambiguous (countervalue + battlefield use) |
Missile Arsenal | Agni series (Agni-V: ICBM), BrahMos | Shaheen series, Nasr, Babur cruise missiles |
- Deterrence Stability in South Asia
- Conceptual Framework
- Deterrence Stability: Both sides are dissuaded from initiating war due to assured retaliation
- South Asia’s geography, short flight times, and political mistrust create high crisis instability
- Historical Crises and Escalation Risks
- Kargil War (1999) – Occurred under the nuclear umbrella
- 2001–02 Parliament Attack – Nearly led to nuclear brinkmanship
- Mumbai Attacks (2008) – No military response due to deterrence
- Uri Surgical Strikes (2016) and Balakot Airstrikes (2019) – Signaled India’s limited escalation doctrine
- Post-Balakot (2019) – Pakistan’s retaliation via Operation Swift Retort showed capability to calibrate response without crossing thresholds
- Cold Start Doctrine (India) and Pakistan’s FSD
- CSD envisions rapid mobilization and shallow incursions
- Pakistan’s FSD and TNWs aim to nullify Cold Start by threatening nuclear response even to conventional invasion
- This introduces “use-it-or-lose-it” pressure and lowers nuclear threshold
- Strategic Instability and Arms Race
- India’s BMD system and MIRVs induce Pakistani fears of first-strike decapitation
- Pakistan compensates with lower yield weapons and MIRV development (Ababeel missile)
As security analyst Feroz Khan warns:
“The stability–instability paradox is dangerously tilted towards instability in South Asia.”
- IR Theoretical Lens
- Realism
Both states operate under realist logic, viewing nuclear weapons as guarantors of sovereignty and power parity.
- Deterrence Theory
- India emphasizes deterrence by punishment through massive retaliation
- Pakistan follows deterrence by denial via TNWs to prevent invasion
- Stability–Instability Paradox
- The presence of nuclear weapons prevents full-scale war but enables low-intensity conflicts
- This paradox plays out in cross-border skirmishes and proxy warfare
- Conclusion
The evolution of India and Pakistan’s nuclear doctrines reflects a complex interplay of threat perceptions, doctrinal innovation, and strategic signaling. While both profess deterrence as their goal, doctrinal ambiguity, technological advances, and political hostilities have made South Asia one of the most volatile nuclear regions globally.
To ensure deterrence stability, both sides must:
- Maintain doctrinal transparency
- Establish nuclear risk reduction centers
- Pursue arms control dialogue under backchannel diplomacy
As former Indian PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee once said:
“Nuclear weapons are not for fighting wars—they are for preventing wars.”
Q6: Define ‘Balancing Act’ in International Relations. What are Pakistan’s imperatives and constraints with regard to maintain balancing in relations with the major powers?
Outline
- Introduction
- Definition and Theoretical Explanation of the Balancing Act
- Historical Context: Pakistan’s Balancing Legacy
- Pakistan’s Strategic Imperatives
- China and the CPEC Partnership
- U.S. as a Traditional Security and Economic Partner
- Relations with Russia
- The Gulf and Iran Equation
- Constraints on Pakistan’s Balancing Act
- Economic Dependency and the IMF/FATF Pressure
- Geopolitical Rivalries (US-China, Iran-Saudi)
- Internal Political Instability and Civil-Military Divide
- Lack of Coherent Foreign Policy Doctrine
- Theoretical Framework: Realism, Neoclassical Realism, and Strategic Hedging
- Policy Recommendations
- Conclusion
- Table: Pakistan’s Imperatives vs. Constraints
- Introduction
In a global order characterized by multipolarity, shifting alliances, and great power competition, Pakistan’s foreign policy is guided by a strategic necessity to balance its relations with major global players. This act of balancing, rather than bandwagoning, is essential for preserving sovereignty, economic viability, and regional stability.
From Washington to Beijing, and Riyadh to Tehran, Pakistan must navigate a complex web of competing interests, which requires a delicate and often constrained balancing act.
- Definition and Theoretical Explanation of the Balancing Act
In International Relations, the “balancing act” refers to a state’s strategy of managing relations with rival powers to avoid overdependence, prevent isolation, and maximize autonomy.
As per Kenneth Waltz (1979):
“States balance against power, not necessarily against threats—this is the structural logic of anarchy.”
Balancing may take two forms:
- Internal Balancing: Building military or economic capacity
- External Balancing: Aligning diplomatically with other states to check the power of a hegemon
In Neoclassical Realism, domestic constraints and leaders’ perceptions also shape balancing behaviors.
- Historical Context: Pakistan’s Balancing Legacy
Pakistan has historically performed a balancing role:
- In the Cold War, it aligned with the U.S.-led bloc while engaging China post-1960s
- Acted as a bridge between U.S. and China via Kissinger’s secret 1971 visit
- During the post-9/11 era, it balanced being a U.S. ally in the War on Terror while protecting its strategic interests in Afghanistan
- In recent decades, China’s rise and the Indo-Pacific shift have made balancing more complex
- Pakistan’s Strategic Imperatives
- Strategic Partnership with China
- China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC): ~$60 billion initiative
- Strategic convergence in countering Indian hegemony, particularly post-2019 Kashmir developments
- Military cooperation, technology transfer, and diplomatic cover at UNSC and FATF
“Our friendship with China is higher than the Himalayas and deeper than the oceans.” — Ayub Khan
- Security and Financial Linkage with the U.S.
- U.S. remains Pakistan’s largest export destination and key provider of IMF and World Bank influence
- Historical military aid and training programs
- Post-2021, U.S.-Pakistan ties reshaped around regional counterterrorism and Afghan stability
“We want stable relations with both China and the United States.” — FM Bilawal Bhutto (2022)
- Engagement with Russia
- Growing convergence on Afghanistan, energy cooperation, and arms procurement
- Pakistan joined the Pakistan Stream Gas Pipeline project (formerly North–South pipeline)
- First-ever PM visit to Moscow in Feb 2022 (coinciding with Ukraine invasion) created diplomatic friction
- Balancing Gulf States and Iran
- GCC countries (especially Saudi Arabia and UAE) are key economic partners
- Pakistan maintains a neutral stance in Saudi–Iran rivalry (e.g., stayed out of Yemen war in 2015)
- Close cultural and religious ties with Iran, especially regarding Shia population and border stability
- Constraints on Pakistan’s Balancing Act
- Economic Dependency
- Pakistan faces chronic trade deficits, high external debt, and currency instability
- IMF bailouts (23 to date), FATF grey-listing (2018–2022) weakened its diplomatic autonomy
- Heavy reliance on remittances from GCC, loans from China, and U.S. financial institutions
- US-China Rivalry
- Growing polarization over technology (TikTok, Huawei), military posturing (AUKUS, QUAD) makes dual engagement harder
- Pressure to distance from China while maintaining U.S. GSP+ status and development aid
- Political Instability
- Frequent government changes, weak institutional memory, and civil-military imbalances undermine foreign policy consistency
- Recent civil-military tensions post-May 9 incidents have worsened perception of instability
- Geopolitical Pressures
- U.S. criticism of CPEC as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
- India’s rising global stature complicates Pakistan’s access to platforms like Quad or G20
- Iran’s proximity and sanctions put pressure on gas pipeline projects like IP gas pipeline
- Limited Soft Power
- Pakistan lacks influence in multilateral diplomacy, global media, and technology
- Perceived as a security state, reducing trust among major powers and investors
- Theoretical Framework
- Realism
- Pakistan’s balancing reflects defensive realism—seeking to preserve sovereignty in a hostile neighborhood
- Pursuing minimum deterrence against India and multipolar engagement globally
- Neoclassical Realism
- Domestic political volatility and elite preferences (e.g., military vs. civilian priorities) shape foreign policy shifts
- Lack of bureaucratic continuity weakens long-term balancing strategies
- Strategic Hedging
- Pakistan employs hedging behavior, cooperating with both U.S. and China to mitigate external shocks
- Avoids overcommitment to either bloc, maintains strategic ambiguity
- Policy Recommendations
- Develop indigenous economic capacity to reduce aid dependency
- Institutionalize a non-aligned doctrine akin to ASEAN’s flexible diplomacy
- Leverage regional forums (SCO, ECO, D-8) to diversify foreign engagements
- Create a National Security Council with parliamentary oversight for continuity
- Invest in diaspora diplomacy, education exports, and green tech partnerships
- Conclusion
Pakistan’s foreign policy is under increasing strain as global geopolitics polarize, and regional fault lines sharpen. Its balancing act is driven by the imperative to secure economic stability, strategic autonomy, and regional equilibrium, yet constrained by economic fragility, internal discord, and external pressure.
In a multipolar world, Pakistan’s success lies in maintaining principled flexibility, avoiding binary choices, and investing in long-term self-reliance.
As IR theorist Joseph Nye notes:
“Smart power is not choosing sides—it’s knowing how to align interests across divides.”
- Table: Pakistan’s Balancing Imperatives vs. Constraints
Major Powers | Imperatives | Constraints |
China | CPEC, strategic support, UNSC veto | Overdependence, U.S. pressure |
U.S. | IMF, export market, tech | Anti-China policy, drone legacy |
Russia | Energy, arms | Ukraine war fallout, Western pushback |
GCC | Remittances, aid | Iran friction, religious politics |
Iran | Border security, gas pipeline | U.S. sanctions, GCC opposition |
Q7. Examine the achievements and challenges in EU–Pakistan relations from the perspective of international political economy.
Outline
- Introduction
- Theoretical Lens: International Political Economy
- Overview of EU–Pakistan Relations
- Achievements in EU–Pakistan Relations
- Trade Expansion via GSP+
- Development Cooperation and Aid
- Political Engagement and Strategic Dialogues
- Migration and People-to-People Linkages
- Key Challenges in EU–Pakistan Relations
- Conditionalities of GSP+ and Human Rights Compliance
- FATF, Terror Financing, and Governance
- Strategic Divergence: India, Russia, and China
- Lack of Economic Diversification and Institutional Capacity
- Theoretical Framework
- Liberal Institutionalism
- Realism and Strategic Competition
- Dependency Theory
- Conclusion
- Visual Aid: Summary Table – EU–Pakistan Relations at a Glance
- Introduction
The European Union (EU) is Pakistan’s largest trading partner, a key development donor, and a critical voice in global governance forums. However, the asymmetry of economic power, coupled with value-based conditionalities, makes the relationship both strategic and sensitive. Viewed through the lens of International Political Economy (IPE), EU–Pakistan relations reflect a blend of opportunity and vulnerability, structured by trade, aid, politics, and power.
- Theoretical Lens: International Political Economy
International Political Economy (IPE) studies how politics and economics interact across borders. It explores how global trade, investment, and institutions shape the relations between states, particularly:
- Liberalism: Focus on cooperation, free trade, and institutions
- Realism: Emphasis on relative gains and strategic interests
- Dependency Theory: Examines power asymmetry between developed and developing nations
- Overview of EU–Pakistan Relations
- Diplomatic ties since 1962
- Strategic Engagement Plan (SEP) signed in 2019
- EU’s role as:
- Largest export destination for Pakistan (34% of exports in 2022)
- Major development partner (€600M in aid over 2014–2020)
- Key GSP+ grantor, allowing tariff-free access on 66% of EU tariff lines
- Regular Human Rights Dialogues, Joint Commission, and Election Observation Missions
- Achievements in EU–Pakistan Relations
- GSP+ and Trade Expansion
- Pakistan received GSP+ status in 2014, renewed in 2024
- Boosted textile and leather exports → over €7.9 billion exports to EU in 2023
- Major markets: Germany, Netherlands, Spain, Italy, Belgium
“GSP+ remains a pillar of our trade diplomacy in Pakistan” — EU Ambassador Riina Kionka (2023)
- Development Cooperation and Aid
- EU supports education, rural development, democracy, and climate resilience
- €265M under Multi-Annual Indicative Programme (MIP) 2021–2027
- Technical support via ECHO (humanitarian aid) and EU-Pakistan Business Forum
- Political Engagement and Strategic Dialogue
- Strategic Engagement Plan (2019) elevated ties to multi-sectoral cooperation
- EU appreciates Pakistan’s role in Afghan stability, counterterrorism, and climate resilience
- Cooperation in migration governance and rule of law reforms
- People-to-People Contacts
- Pakistani diaspora in EU: over 1 million, mainly in UK, Italy, Germany, and Spain
- Joint scholarships (e.g., Erasmus+) and research exchanges under Horizon Europe
- Key Challenges in EU–Pakistan Relations
- GSP+ Conditionality and Human Rights Scrutiny
- GSP+ requires compliance with 27 UN conventions on human rights, labor, corruption, and environment
- EU Parliament resolution (April 2021) expressed concern over blasphemy laws, minority rights, and media freedom
- Potential GSP+ withdrawal remains a pressure tool
“Trade preferences must be tied to values” – David McAllister, EU MEP (2021)
- FATF and Governance Weaknesses
- EU aligned with FATF reforms, and Pakistan’s past grey-listing impacted EU perceptions
- Weak judicial enforcement, corruption, and lack of bureaucratic reform pose compliance risks
- Strategic Divergences
- EU’s growing strategic convergence with India (India–EU Connectivity Partnership 2021)
- Tensions over Russia (Ukraine war): Pakistan’s Moscow visit in 2022 drew EU criticism
- EU’s cautious stance toward CPEC and Chinese digital infrastructure
- Lack of Institutional Capacity
- Pakistan struggles with regulatory compliance, labor protections, and environmental safeguards
- Weak capacity of Ministry of Commerce and TDAP in leveraging trade opportunities
- Overdependence on low-value textiles, lack of export diversification
- Theoretical Framework
- Liberal Institutionalism
- EU–Pakistan ties reflect liberal ideals of cooperation through norms, aid, and trade
- GSP+, SEP, and Erasmus+ reflect positive-sum engagement
- Realism
- EU also uses trade and aid as strategic leverage—conditionalities reflect power-based diplomacy
- EU’s tilt toward India as a democratic partner complicates Pakistan’s regional positioning
- Dependency Theory
- Pakistan remains a raw material supplier and aid-dependent economy
- Structural dependency reinforced via EU-imposed standards, regulatory conditionalities, and donor–recipient hierarchy
- Conclusion
EU–Pakistan relations are a strategic partnership shaped by trade, values, and asymmetry. While Pakistan has significantly benefited from GSP+, development cooperation, and diaspora diplomacy, it must enhance institutional governance, human rights compliance, and export diversification to sustain the trajectory.
The future of this relationship lies in mutual respect, pragmatic diplomacy, and Pakistan’s ability to assert economic agency without alienating normative partners like the EU.
As former EU Ambassador Jean-François Cautain said:
“We are not here to lecture, but to partner with Pakistan toward shared prosperity.”
- Visual Aid: EU–Pakistan Relations Summary Table
Area | Achievement | Challenge |
Trade | GSP+ access, €7.9B exports | Risk of revocation, limited diversification |
Aid | €600M+ in development programs | Governance gaps, delivery issues |
Dialogue | Strategic Engagement Plan, HR Dialogues | Human rights concerns, blasphemy laws |
Education | Erasmus+, research grants | Brain drain, limited tech absorption |
Strategy | Afghan cooperation, anti-terrorism | Divergence on Russia, India, and China |
Q8: What are China’s interests in Afghanistan? Discuss its role and options in the country following the U.S. exit.
Outline
- Introduction
- China’s Strategic Interests in Afghanistan
- Security Interests (ETIM, regional terrorism)
- Economic Interests (Minerals, BRI expansion)
- Geopolitical Balancing (U.S. exit, India containment)
- China’s Role in Afghanistan Post-U.S. Withdrawal
- Diplomatic Recognition and Engagement
- Economic Investment and Mining
- Multilateral Platforms (SCO, Moscow Format)
- China’s Options: Strategic Pathways
- Engagement without Intervention
- Afghanistan’s Integration into BRI
- Security Cooperation via SCO
- Containment of Spillover to Xinjiang
- Theoretical Framework
- Realism
- Geoeconomics
- Strategic Hedging
- Implications for the Region (incl. Pakistan)
- Conclusion
- Visual Table: China’s Interests, Roles, and Options
- Introduction
The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 after two decades of war left a power vacuum and a fragile security environment. Into this void, China emerged as a key regional player, aiming to protect its interests without assuming hegemonic responsibilities. While avoiding entanglement in Afghanistan’s complex internal politics, China has pursued a strategic balancing approach focused on security, economic opportunity, and geopolitical leverage.
- China’s Strategic Interests in Afghanistan
- Security Interests – Counterterrorism and Xinjiang
China’s core concern is the spillover of instability from Afghanistan into its Xinjiang region, which shares a 76 km border with the Wakhan Corridor.
- The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a Uighur separatist group, allegedly has a presence in Afghanistan
- China fears that a Taliban-led Afghanistan could serve as a safe haven for transnational jihadists
“China firmly opposes Afghanistan becoming a hotbed of terrorism again.” — Wang Yi, Former Chinese FM (2021)
- Economic Interests – Mineral Wealth and BRI
- Afghanistan is estimated to have $1–3 trillion worth of untapped mineral reserves, including lithium, copper, gold, and rare earths
- China, facing global competition for green energy materials, sees Afghanistan as a resource frontier
- Afghanistan’s strategic location offers connectivity between Central Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East, vital for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
- Geopolitical Interests – U.S. Exit and Indian Influence
- The U.S. withdrawal is viewed by Beijing as a symbol of declining American credibility, enabling China to project soft power and expand influence
- China also seeks to counter India’s presence in Afghanistan, which was significant before 2021 (with over $3B in aid and infrastructure investment)
- China’s Role in Afghanistan Post-U.S. Withdrawal
- Diplomatic Recognition and Engagement
- China did not close its embassy in Kabul post-Taliban takeover
- Hosted Taliban delegations in Tianjin (2021) and Doha to negotiate security guarantees
- Appointed Ambassador Zhao Sheng in 2023, becoming the first country to reassign an ambassador under Taliban rule
“We respect Afghanistan’s sovereignty and independence.” — Chinese MFA (2023)
- Economic Investment and Mining Projects
- In January 2023, a $540 million deal was signed with Chinese company CNEEC for oil exploration in Amu Darya
- China Metallurgical Group holds a long-term lease on Mes Aynak copper mine, though progress remains stalled due to instability
- Proposed rail and road linkages via Wakhan Corridor to connect Afghanistan to CPEC
- Multilateral Engagement: SCO and Moscow Format
- China leads efforts through Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to promote regional counterterrorism cooperation
- Supports Afghanistan’s inclusion as an observer and calls for an inclusive government
- Collaborates with Russia, Iran, and Pakistan in the Moscow Format talks
- China’s Options: Strategic Pathways
- Engagement without Intervention
China is pursuing a “non-interventionist engagement strategy”, offering economic incentives and diplomatic legitimacy without direct interference.
- No military bases or security forces
- Relies on Pakistan and regional partners for intelligence and border stability
- Integrating Afghanistan into BRI
- Potential integration of Afghanistan into China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor
- Supports connectivity through Gwadar and CPEC’s western alignment
- Risks: Taliban’s inability to guarantee infrastructure security, threat of sabotage by ISKP or other militant groups
- Security Cooperation via SCO
- Strengthens counterterrorism coordination via Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS) of SCO
- Advocates joint military exercises and intelligence-sharing among Central Asian Republics (CARs)
- ETIM Containment through Taliban Leverage
- In exchange for economic cooperation, China demands Taliban crackdown on ETIM and affiliated groups
- Taliban has given verbal assurances, but ground implementation remains uncertain
- Theoretical Framework
- Realism
- China’s approach reflects offensive realism: maximizing influence with minimal risk
- Seeking power projection and security without direct hegemony
- Viewing Afghanistan as a strategic buffer against Western encroachment
- Geoeconomics
- Economic instruments like mining contracts, infrastructure, and energy deals are China’s primary tools
- Prioritizes resource extraction and connectivity over military control
- Strategic Hedging
- China balances between economic engagement, regional diplomacy, and indirect security pressure
- Avoids deep entanglement while positioning itself as a post-U.S. stabilizer
- Implications for the Region (Including Pakistan)
- China relies heavily on Pakistan’s cooperation to manage Afghan affairs
- Afghanistan’s stability is crucial for CPEC’s security, particularly Balochistan and western routes
- Joint interest in blocking TTP–ETIM links, yet China–Pakistan–Taliban triangle is fragile
- China’s increasing footprint raises geostrategic concern in Delhi and Washington, but offers regional states an alternative to Western aid dependency
- Conclusion
China’s engagement in post-U.S. Afghanistan is marked by cautious pragmatism, aiming to secure borders, extract resources, and expand influence without becoming a security guarantor. Its interest-driven policy reflects a realist approach, but grounded in economic leverage and multilateral engagement.
Going forward, China’s success in Afghanistan depends on:
- Taliban’s ability to deliver on security promises
- Viable economic governance to attract long-term investment
- Regional coordination via SCO, BRI, and diplomacy
As scholar Andrew Small writes:
“China wants an Afghanistan that is stable enough for investment, but not open enough for external competition.”
- Visual Aid: Summary Table – China’s Interests, Roles, and Options in Afghanistan
Domain | China’s Interests | Post-U.S. Role | Options Available |
Security | Counter ETIM, protect Xinjiang | Engage Taliban diplomatically | Leverage SCO, use Pakistan as buffer |
Economic | Minerals, BRI access | Signed mining, oil contracts | Infrastructure via Wakhan Corridor |
Geopolitics | Limit U.S./Indian footprint | Taliban recognition, soft power | Expand BRI, offer diplomatic platform |