Q1: The creation of more provinces is a persistent demand from some circles in Pakistan. How do you see the creation of more provinces in Pakistan; as beneficial or harmful for the people? Explain your views with solid justification.
- Introduction
The demand for the creation of new provinces in Pakistan has persisted for decades—most notably in South Punjab, Hazara, Bahawalpur, and FATA. The debate hinges on whether new provinces would lead to better governance and inclusivity or trigger ethnic fragmentation and political instability. This question is both political and constitutional, deeply tied to Pakistan’s federal dynamics.
- Current Provincial Structure
Province | Area Share | Population Share (2023 Census) |
Punjab | ~26% | ~53% |
Sindh | ~18% | ~22% |
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa | ~10% | ~16% |
Balochistan | ~44% | ~6% |
- Article 239(4) of the Constitution requires 2/3rd majority in both the provincial assembly and parliament to alter provincial boundaries.
- Arguments in Favor of More Provinces
- Administrative Efficiency
- Easier governance in geographically large areas like South Punjab and Balochistan
- Quicker delivery of public services and better law enforcement
- Political Inclusivity
- Smaller ethnic groups (e.g., Seraikis, Hazaras) feel underrepresented
- Creation of provinces may reduce center–periphery tensions
- Equitable Resource Distribution
- Current NFC Award and budget allocations disproportionately benefit centralized provincial elites
- New provinces can better address local development needs
- Historical Precedent
- East Pakistan’s separation partly rooted in lack of autonomy
- FATA’s merger into KP improved legal and administrative access
- Arguments Against Creating More Provinces
- Ethnic Fragmentation
- May lead to demands for identity-based provinces (e.g., Mohajir Sooba)
- Could destabilize national unity
- Increased Fiscal Burden
- New provinces mean new bureaucracies, assemblies, police, and courts
- Adds strain on Pakistan’s already stressed budget
- Political Manipulation
- Ruling parties may exploit new provinces for vote bank politics
- Risks of gerrymandering and corruption increase
- Weak Institutional Capacity
- Even existing provinces suffer from governance deficits
- Adding more administrative layers could amplify mismanagement
- Scholarly and Constitutional Perspectives
- Dr. Ijaz Shafi Gilani (Gallup Pakistan): “More provinces may democratize governance, but must not follow ethnic lines.”
- Dr. Ishrat Husain: “Pakistan needs administrative, not ethnic decentralization.”
- Constitutional Expert Hamid Khan: “Article 239 provides a legitimate mechanism; the fear lies in its politicization.”
- International Comparisons
Country | Federal Units | Population (millions) |
India | 28 states + 8 UTs | 1,428M |
Nigeria | 36 states | ~223M |
Pakistan | 4 provinces + 1 federal territory | ~241M |
Pakistan, despite a huge population, has the fewest federal units among federations.
- Evaluative Analysis: Beneficial or Harmful?
Creating more provinces can be beneficial if done on administrative criteria, not ethnic or linguistic bases. It can improve governance, reduce regional alienation, and deepen federalism. However, if politicized, it may fragment society, increase sectarian claims, and overburden state finances.
- Recommendations
Area | Measure |
Constitutional | Strengthen Article 239 implementation via parliamentary committee |
Administrative | Use population, geography, and HDI as criteria—not language or ethnicity |
Institutional | Create Provincial Boundary Commission under CCI |
Fiscal | Ensure NFC Award adjusts equitably for new provinces |
Civic Engagement | Consult local populations via referendum or assemblies |
- Conclusion
The creation of more provinces in Pakistan can be a step towards strengthening federalism and improving public service delivery, but only if pursued through consensus, clear criteria, and institutional safeguards. It must not become a tool of political opportunism or ethnic division, but rather an instrument for inclusion, equity, and stability.
Q2: Discuss Pakistan’s historic role in the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) and under the framework of regional integration; what are the future prospects of ECO for Pakistan?
- Introduction
- Overview of ECO
| Feature | Details |
| Founded | 1985 (replacing RCD – Regional Cooperation for Development 1964–1979) |
| Members | 10: Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan |
| Headquarters | Tehran, Iran |
| Objective | Promote trade, transport, energy, and regional development through economic cooperation |
- Pakistan’s Historic Role in ECO
- a) Founding Member (with Iran & Turkey)
- Played a leading role in transitioning from RCD to ECO in 1985.
- b) Key Host of ECO Summits
- Hosted multiple summits including the 13th (Islamabad, 2017) and ministerial meetings.
- c) Trade & Transit Contributions
- Located at the center of the region, Pakistan offers access to the Arabian Sea via Gwadar Port.
- Supports ECO Trade Agreement (ECOTA) and Transit Transport Framework Agreement (TTFA).
- d) Strategic Infrastructure Engagement
- Pakistan has promoted projects like ECO Rail, Quetta–Zahedan railway, and Istanbul–Tehran–Islamabad freight corridor.
- Achievements and Limitations of ECO
| Achievements | Limitations |
| Shared platforms for trade, culture, and transport | Intra-ECO trade remains under 10% of total trade |
| Energy cooperation: CASA-1000, TAPI pipelines | Political distrust among members (Iran–Turkey, Afghanistan–others) |
| Revival of transport corridors (e.g., ITI freight train) | Lack of institutional funding and weak dispute resolution |
| CPEC alignment potential | Absence of customs and visa facilitation |
- Strategic Importance of ECO for Pakistan
- Geo-economic pivot: Pakistan’s geography links Central Asia to the Arabian Sea.
- Gwadar Port: Serves as a southern gateway for ECO’s landlocked members.
- CPEC-ECO Integration: China’s BRI and ECO corridors can intersect for mutual benefit.
- Energy security: Through TAPI, Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline, and regional electricity trade.
- Alternative to SAARC: Amid Indo-Pak tensions, ECO provides a functional regional bloc.
- Future Prospects of ECO for Pakistan
| Domain | Prospects |
| Trade | Expansion of ECOTA and PTA with ECO countries can reduce trade dependence on West |
| Connectivity | Enhanced transport corridors (rail, road, fiber optics) through Pakistan |
| Energy | Central Asian surplus energy via CASA-1000; pipelines can stabilize Pakistan’s energy market |
| Strategic Balancing | Strengthens Pakistan’s link with Central Asia, bypassing India |
| Multilateral Diplomacy | Promotes soft power through cultural diplomacy and economic leadership |
- Challenges Facing ECO’s Effectiveness
- Institutional Weakness: ECO lacks enforcement authority or strong secretariat.
- Political Tensions: Intra-member rivalries (e.g., Afghanistan instability, Iran sanctions).
- Infrastructure Gaps: Underdeveloped roads, railways, and border logistics.
- Lack of Visa Liberalization: Trade and tourism face bureaucratic hurdles.
- Overlap with Other Blocs: Members are also in SCO, BRI, OIC, which divides focus.
- Recommendations for Pakistan
| Area | Strategy |
| Economic Diplomacy | Take lead in revising and implementing ECOTA & TTFA |
| Infrastructure Development | Complete Gwadar connectivity (ML-1, ECO highways, ITI rail) |
| Energy Strategy | Fast-track regional energy projects with Iran and Central Asia |
| Multilateral Engagement | Push for institutional reforms in ECO (dispute resolution, funding, arbitration) |
| Digital Integration | Lead in building an “ECO Digital Market” for e-commerce & fintech |
- Conclusion
Q3: Critically evaluate the US–Pakistan relations under the Joe Biden Administration vis-à-vis the US Indo-Pacific Strategy.
- Introduction
- Overview: Biden Administration’s Foreign Policy Focus
- Reassert U.S. leadership through alliances
- Counter China’s influence in Asia-Pacific
- Emphasis on democratic values, technology control, and secure supply chains
- Prioritize Quad, AUKUS, IPEF over traditional conflict zones
- What is the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy?
| Element | Description |
| Goal | Counter China’s economic and military assertiveness |
| Allies | India, Japan, Australia, South Korea, ASEAN |
| Key Components | Free and open Indo-Pacific, rules-based order, secure sea lanes, Taiwan defense |
| Frameworks | QUAD, AUKUS, Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) |
- Pakistan is not part of any Indo-Pacific framework
- U.S. strategic tilt toward India as key partner in region
- U.S.–Pakistan Relations: Historical Context
| Period | Character |
| Cold War | Ally via SEATO, CENTO; anti-Soviet partnership |
| 2001–2011 | Frontline partner in War on Terror; military and economic aid |
| 2011–2020 | Strategic mistrust post-Osama raid, Salala incident, FATF issues |
| 2021–Present | Functional but distant ties; limited engagement post-Afghanistan withdrawal |
- Key Developments under Biden
| Area | Status |
| Afghanistan | Biden coordinated withdrawal; minimal consultation with Pakistan |
| Diplomatic Engagement | No direct Biden–Sharif call until 2023; downgraded political focus |
| Security | Limited cooperation on counterterrorism; no major defense deals |
| Economy | GSP privileges not renewed; minimal U.S. investment in CPEC regions |
| Military Ties | $450 million F-16 maintenance deal approved (2022) — symbolic but not strategic |
| Climate/Health | Collaboration under GLOBE Act, COVID-19 vaccines support via COVAX |
- Strategic Divergences: Indo-Pacific vs. Pakistan’s Strategic Orientation
| U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy | Pakistan’s Position |
| Embrace India as counterweight to China | CPEC + Strategic partnership with China |
| Focus on maritime Asia-Pacific | Pakistan’s strategic depth lies in South–Central Asia |
| Emphasis on democratic alliances | Pakistan seen as politically unstable, hybrid regime |
| Isolation of Iran | Pakistan seeks regional connectivity through Iran, Afghanistan |
- Scholarly and Strategic Perspectives
- Dr. Moeed Yusuf: “Pakistan is a casualty of U.S. strategic realignment, not a deliberate opponent.”
- Michael Kugelman (Wilson Center): “Biden policy toward Pakistan is one of benign neglect—focused on minimal engagement.”
- Lisa Curtis (CSIS): “U.S. values Pakistan’s stability but mistrusts its China linkages and Afghanistan leverage.”
- Critical Evaluation: Challenges and Missed Opportunities
- From Strategic to Transactional
- U.S. no longer sees Pakistan as a major strategic asset.
- Military and economic engagements are minimal compared to Cold War or War on Terror periods.
- India-Centric Tilt
- Indo-Pacific strategy centers India as “net security provider.”
- Pakistan perceives threat to strategic balance in South Asia.
- Over-Reliance on China
- Pakistan’s deepening dependence on China reduces maneuvering space.
- U.S. reluctant to engage Pakistan deeply due to CPEC and Huawei concerns.
- Missed Economic Potential
- Pakistan not part of IPEF or tech partnerships.
- Minimal U.S. FDI, lack of market access support.
- Policy Recommendations for Pakistan
| Domain | Strategy |
| Diplomacy | Engage U.S. through climate, counterterrorism, and economic forums |
| Strategic Balance | Avoid zero-sum alignments; maintain ties with both China and the West |
| Trade | Lobby for GSP+ access, digital economy inclusion |
| Public Diplomacy | Use diaspora and think tanks to improve Pakistan’s image in D.C. |
| Regional Cooperation | Showcase role in Afghan stability, anti-terrorism efforts, and regional energy corridors |
- Conclusion
Q4: Saudi Arabia and Iran both have significant place in Pakistan’s foreign policy. How can Pakistan maintain friendly relations with both, especially after the mediation of China between the two countries?
- Introduction
- Importance of Saudi Arabia and Iran in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy
| Country | Importance |
| Saudi Arabia | Strategic ally, OIC leader, remittance source (~$6B/year), oil supplier, religious & ideological influence |
| Iran | Immediate neighbor, shared border (~900 km), economic & energy potential, border security cooperation, cultural/religious ties |
- China’s Mediation: A New Regional Dynamic
- Beijing Agreement (March 2023) led to the restoration of diplomatic ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran after a 7-year freeze.
- Brokered in contrast to U.S.-centric diplomacy, signaling China’s rising influence in the Middle East.
- Created space for Muslim-majority nations like Pakistan to engage in neutral diplomacy rather than sectarian alignments.
- Areas of Conflict and Convergence for Pakistan
| Area | Saudi Arabia | Iran |
| Security Concerns | Seeks Pakistan’s military support (e.g., Islamic Military Alliance) | Concerned about border insurgency and proxy groups |
| Energy Cooperation | Oil financing and deferred payment plans | Proposed gas pipelines (e.g., Iran–Pakistan pipeline) |
| Trade | Low non-oil trade (~$4B) | Severely underutilized due to U.S. sanctions |
| Geopolitics | Aligns with U.S. & anti-Iran blocs | Often at odds with U.S. & GCC |
| Religious Influence | Sunni ideological presence | Shia cultural ties, especially in Balochistan |
- Strategic Significance of the China-Brokered Normalization
- Reduces pressure on Pakistan to “choose sides” in Gulf conflicts (Yemen, Syria)
- Opens doors for trilateral cooperation (Pakistan–Iran–Saudi) in trade, infrastructure, and security
- Enables Pakistan to expand CPEC connectivity toward Iran and potentially link with Gulf infrastructure initiatives
- How Pakistan Can Maintain Balanced Relations
| Strategy | Description |
| Geoeconomic Pivot | Prioritize regional trade and connectivity (e.g., Gwadar–Chabahar linkage) over military blocs |
| Religious Neutrality | Promote sectarian harmony at home to avoid external polarization |
| Border Management | Strengthen Iran–Pakistan border surveillance and cooperation (especially after 2024 skirmishes) |
| Parallel Engagements | Continue high-level diplomacy with both—joint forums, bilateral visits, economic cooperation |
| Support China’s Role | Actively align with China’s Middle East strategy to remain a neutral and credible mediator |
- Scholarly and Strategic Views
- Dr. Rabia Akhtar (NUST): “Pakistan must adopt a transactional yet balanced approach—military ties with KSA, economic corridor potential with Iran.”
- Ayesha Siddiqa: “The China-mediated détente between Iran and Saudi Arabia is Pakistan’s best chance to stabilize its sectarian balance.”
- Middle East Institute (2023): “Pakistan can emerge as a regional integrator if it leverages its ties with all three: Iran, Saudi Arabia, and China.”
- Policy Recommendations
| Area | Measures |
| Trade | Establish trilateral trade agreements (Pakistan–KSA–Iran) post-Iran sanctions relief |
| Energy | Complete Iran–Pakistan gas pipeline segment with strategic exemptions or Chinese investment |
| Security | Set up joint border monitoring and anti-terror coordination centers with Iran |
| Multilateralism | Use OIC, ECO, and SCO platforms to engage both countries in broader regional dialogues |
| Public Diplomacy | Promote cultural diplomacy, academic exchanges, and religious tolerance narratives |
- Conclusion
Q5: Palestine conflict is a long-standing one on the United Nations table. Discuss its recent escalation since October 2023 and critically assess the big powers’ reaction to it
- Introduction
- Historical Context
- The conflict centers on the status of East Jerusalem, the right of return, and the Gaza Strip and West Bank territories.
- Despite the Oslo Accords (1993–95), no lasting peace has materialized.
- The UN Resolution 242 calls for Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories—a demand never fulfilled.
- October 2023 Escalation
- a) Trigger: Hamas’ Attack on Israel
- On October 7, 2023, Hamas launched a massive surprise assault from Gaza into Israel, killing over 1,300 Israelis and taking hostages.
- Israel declared a state of war and launched massive retaliatory strikes on Gaza.
- b) Israeli Offensive in Gaza
- Israel’s response included:
- Total blockade (cutting off water, fuel, food)
- Airstrikes, drone attacks, and ground invasions
- Destruction of hospitals, schools, and refugee camps
- c) Humanitarian Catastrophe
- As of June 2025:
- Over 55,000 Palestinians killed, including 15,000+ children
- 1.7 million displaced (UNRWA)
- 70% of Gaza’s infrastructure destroyed
- UN Response
- The UN repeatedly called for humanitarian ceasefires.
- UN General Assembly passed several resolutions demanding immediate cessation of hostilities and protection of civilians.
- International Court of Justice (ICJ) is hearing South Africa’s genocide case against Israel.
- Reaction of Major Global Powers
- United States
- Strongly supported Israel’s right to self-defense.
- Vetoed multiple UNSC resolutions calling for ceasefires (Oct 2023–April 2024).
- Provided military aid and intelligence.
- As humanitarian conditions worsened, the Biden administration began pushing for “ceasefire with conditions”, including hostage release.
- European Union & United Kingdom
- Initially backed Israel, but public pressure and atrocities shifted opinion.
- Spain, Ireland, and Norway officially recognized Palestine (May 2024).
- UK (under Keir Starmer, 2025) suspended arms trade talks with Israel and condemned settlement expansion.
- EU diplomats called for an independent probe into incidents like the Flour Massacre (Feb 2024).
- China and Russia
- China played a diplomatic role, backing ceasefire and hosting intra-Palestinian unity talks.
- Russia accused the West of applying double standards and criticized Israel’s military actions.
- Both nations vetoed U.S.-led resolutions shielding Israel and demanded humanitarian corridors.
- Muslim World
- OIC members, including Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, condemned Israeli actions.
- Gulf states paused normalization talks with Israel.
- South Africa led legal action at ICJ alleging genocide against Palestinians.
- Critical Assessment of Big Powers’ Response
| Power | Role | Critique |
| USA | Strategic ally of Israel | Inconsistent with international humanitarian law; delayed shift toward ceasefire |
| EU | Gradual shift to pro-ceasefire stance | Fragmented response; stronger from Spain/Ireland than France/Germany |
| Russia/China | Balancing Western hegemony | Used conflict for geopolitical positioning, but supported UN humanitarian action |
| Muslim World | United in rhetoric | Limited action beyond diplomacy; no tangible enforcement of red lines |
- Latest Developments (As of June 2025)
- Israel resumed bombings in Rafah (May 2025), killing 400+ civilians.
- Iran-Israel tensions flared after Israel struck Iranian military targets; Iran retaliated with over 100 drones.
- UK and Spain suspended arms trade with Israel citing “deliberate deprivation of essentials” in Gaza.
- Palestinian ambassador to UK urged G7 and UN to recognize Palestine and enforce a two-state solution.
- ICC arrest warrants issued for Israeli PM Netanyahu and Defense Minister Gallant for potential war crimes.
- Conclusion
Q6: Evaluate the implications of Ukraine War for the Russia–Europe energy relations.
- Introduction
- Pre-War Russia–Europe Energy Dependence
| Energy Source | Russia’s Share in EU Imports (2021) |
| Natural Gas | ~45% |
| Crude Oil | ~27% |
| Coal | ~46% |
- Key infrastructure: Nord Stream 1, Yamal-Europe, Druzhba pipeline
- Countries like Germany, Hungary, and Austria were most reliant.
- The Ukraine War: Key Triggers and Timeline
- February 24, 2022: Russia invades Ukraine.
- Sanctions Regime: EU bans on oil imports, price caps on Russian crude, and attempts to freeze assets.
- Gazprom cut-offs: Russia halted or reduced gas flows via Nord Stream 1; Nord Stream 2 never operationalized.
- Sabotage in September 2022: Nord Stream pipelines damaged—heightening tensions and ending direct gas flows.
- Immediate Energy Fallout
- a) Energy Crisis in Europe
- Gas prices surged to €300/MWh in 2022 (10x usual levels).
- Winter 2022–23 prompted emergency LNG imports and coal revival.
- b) Russian Revenues Surged (Initially)
- Despite sanctions, higher prices led to record Russian export earnings in 2022.
- c) Shift in Energy Trade Routes
- EU turned to Norway, Algeria, Qatar, U.S. LNG
- Russia increased oil exports to India and China at discounted rates.
- Long-Term Implications on Energy Relations
| Consequence | Impact |
| Decoupling of Gas Ties | EU-Russia gas trade almost fully halted |
| End of Energy Interdependence | Strategic divorce after decades of reliance |
| Loss of Trust | Energy weaponization undermines future cooperation |
| Diversification Push | Europe is accelerating toward renewables and LNG sources |
- European Energy Diversification Strategy
- a) LNG Infrastructure Expansion
- Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands built floating LNG terminals (FSRUs).
- Norway became Europe’s largest gas supplier in 2023.
- b) Green Transition Acceleration
- EU’s REPowerEU Plan (2022) targets 45% renewable share by 2030.
- Solar and wind investments surged across Europe.
- c) Pipeline Alternatives
- Southern Gas Corridor through Azerbaijan and Turkey
- Increased ties with North African gas exporters
- Russia’s Energy Pivot to Asia and Global South
| Region | Strategy |
| China | Boosted pipeline gas via Power of Siberia; new routes under discussion |
| India | Became top buyer of Russian crude (despite Western pressure) |
| Middle East/Africa | Building partnerships via BRICS and OPEC+ |
| Global South | Sought to diversify away from Western markets and payment systems (e.g., de-dollarization) |
- Scholarly and Institutional Perspectives
- IEA Report (2023): “Russia may never regain its previous share in European energy markets.”
- Dr. Daniel Yergin: “The Russia–Europe energy divorce is structural, not cyclical.”
- EU Commission: “Energy security is now a matter of sovereignty, not just economics.”
- Conclusion
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