Introduction

The United States’ withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 and the subsequent Taliban takeover altered the security and diplomatic dynamics of South and Central Asia. The resultant power vacuum created both opportunities and threats for regional actors—particularly China and Pakistan, two countries with contiguous borders and interlinked security and economic interests. With instability looming large in Afghanistan, both nations have attempted to coordinate efforts to ensure regional peace, economic continuity, and containment of militancy. However, their cooperation is not devoid of strategic tensions and policy divergences.

From a realist perspective, Pakistan and China’s engagement in post-withdrawal Afghanistan is driven by core national interests: maintaining regional security, limiting Western influence, suppressing terrorism, and enhancing economic connectivity. Yet, each state pursues its own priorities, shaped by distinct threat perceptions, diplomatic strategies, and regional aspirations.

Afghanistan’s Strategic Relevance to China and Pakistan

Afghanistan is not just a neighbor; it is a geopolitical pivot. It borders Pakistan’s restive tribal regions and shares a narrow frontier with China’s sensitive Xinjiang province. For Pakistan, Afghanistan’s stability is essential to control cross-border militancy, refugee influx, and preserve strategic depth. For China, instability poses threats to its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the potential radicalization of Uighur Muslims via the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM).

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi once remarked:

“Afghanistan should not again become a sanctuary for terrorism or a playground for great power rivalry.”

China-Pakistan Cooperation Mechanisms in Post-US Afghanistan

1. Diplomatic Coordination and Taliban Engagement

China and Pakistan have worked in close coordination to maintain communication with the Taliban regime. Notably:

• Troika Plus talks (China, Russia, US, Pakistan) emphasized inclusive governance and counterterrorism.
• China hosted the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on Afghanistan (Tunxi, 2022).
• Pakistan facilitated backchannel diplomacy between Kabul and Beijing, serving as a bridge state.

The two nations share an interest in preventing Afghanistan’s isolation, which could worsen radicalization and humanitarian distress.

2. Counterterrorism Collaboration

China and Pakistan are both victims of Afghanistan-based militancy:

• China fears ETIM operating in Badakhshan.
• Pakistan faces a resurgent TTP, which carried out over 400 attacks in 2023 alone, many launched from Afghan territory (Source: PIPS Annual Security Report, 2023).

Both sides engage in intelligence-sharing and joint counterterrorism drills like the “Shaheen” series, yet field coordination remains limited.

3. Humanitarian and Economic Engagement

China pledged ¥200 million in aid to Afghanistan post-withdrawal, much of it routed through Pakistan. Moreover, China has expressed interest in extending CPEC to Afghanistan, enabling a direct trade link between Kashgar, Kabul, and Gwadar.

Shared Strategic Interests Between Pakistan and China

This alignment creates a convergence of interests rooted in regional stability, non-interference, and geostrategic utility.

Points of Divergence in the China-Pakistan Approach

Despite converging interests, there are critical divergences:

1. Differing Threat Perceptions: ETIM vs TTP

China’s focus remains squarely on ETIM, which it views as a direct threat to its internal security in Xinjiang. Pakistan, however, considers TTP its primary adversary. The Taliban’s reluctance to crack down on TTP contrasts with its reported assurances to China on curbing ETIM.

“Pakistan bleeds daily due to the TTP’s sanctuary in Afghanistan,” stated former NSA Moeed Yusuf.
“China’s silence on TTP, and the Taliban’s selective counterterrorism, is an emerging sore point.”

2. Taliban Recognition and Diplomacy

While Pakistan pushed early for Taliban recognition, China adopted a wait-and-see approach, insisting on inclusive governance, education for girls, and counterterrorism guarantees. This diplomatic divergence hinders the formation of a joint regional strategy.

3. Security of Chinese Nationals in Pakistan

Incidents like the Dasu bus attack (2021) and Karachi University bombing (2022)—both targeting Chinese personnel—have made Beijing wary of Pakistan’s domestic security apparatus. China temporarily halted several CPEC projects following these attacks, demanding tighter security measures.

Visual Aid: Regional Convergence & Divergence Map

              +———————+            +———————+

              |    Shared Goals     |            |    Points of Tension |

              +———————+            +———————+

              |  Counterterrorism   |            |   ETIM vs TTP focus  |

              |  Economic Projects  |            | Taliban recognition  |

              |  Regional Balance   |            | Security distrust    |

              +———————+            +———————+

IR Theoretical Perspective

1. Realism (Kenneth Waltz, Morgenthau)

This situation reflects classic realism: states act in self-interest to ensure survival and security. China’s engagement in Afghanistan is a strategic move to prevent instability from spilling into Xinjiang. Pakistan seeks strategic depth and containment of anti-state actors.

1. Constructivism (Alexander Wendt)

Norms and identities influence policy. Pakistan shares ethnic, religious, and ideological proximity with the Taliban, shaping its softer approach. China’s identity as a secular, authoritarian state drives its transactional diplomacy with clear red lines.

Recent Developments and Strategic Calculations

• In 2023, China announced a $10 billion lithium investment deal with Afghanistan, bypassing Pakistan’s transit route—a signal of independent engagement.
• Pakistan’s recent military operations in North Waziristan came after Afghanistan’s Taliban government refused to curb TTP activity.
• Taliban Foreign Ministry openly rebuked Islamabad’s cross-border strikes in 2024, escalating diplomatic tensions.

Such incidents indicate that despite cooperation, strategic mistrust persists, especially on security coordination.

Future Prospects and Policy Recommendations

1. Institutionalize a Trilateral Security Forum
   A formal China-Pakistan-Afghanistan security mechanism should be developed under the SCO umbrella, with a focus on cross-border intelligence sharing and counterterrorism.
2. Expand Economic Diplomacy
   Pakistan can facilitate China-Afghanistan trade by enabling rail links from Peshawar to Kabul, boosting its geopolitical utility.
3. Align Counterterrorism Frameworks
   China must acknowledge the TTP threat to Pakistan, just as Pakistan recognizes ETIM as a red line for China.
4. Ensure Security of Chinese Investments
   Islamabad must maintain elite security units for CPEC, as trust is a prerequisite for long-term investment.

Conclusion

Pakistan and China’s engagement in Afghanistan reflects pragmatic realism infused with strategic necessity. Both seek to stabilize Afghanistan for their own benefit: Pakistan for security and strategic influence; China for counterterrorism and economic outreach. Despite shared objectives, asymmetries in priorities, trust deficits, and divergent Taliban engagement models continue to challenge deeper integration.

As Dr. Huma Baqai aptly notes:

“Afghanistan is a chessboard of Asian diplomacy, and China and Pakistan are both players and stakeholders. The question is—can they move in unison or play against each other?”

Only through calibrated diplomacy, security cooperation, and mutual threat recognition can China and Pakistan prevent Afghanistan from slipping back into regional chaos.